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LEGAL	IMPEDIMENTS	FACING	NONIMMIGRANTS	
ENTERING	LICENSED	PROFESSIONS
By Justin Storch1
In 2005, Karen LeClerc, Guillame Jarry, 
Beatrice Boulord, Maureen Affl eck, Caroline Wallace, 
and Emily Maw sought admission to the Louisiana 
Bar.2 Emily Maw, a graduate of  Tulane University 
Law School, and the others, who were graduates 
of  law schools outside the United States, were all in 
the United States legally on J-1 or H-1B visas.3 J-1 
visas allow participants in exchange-visitor programs 
to travel to the United States, whereas H-1B visas 
provide opportunities for foreign workers in specialty 
occupations to work in the United States.
Despite their good academic standing, and 
the fact that Emily Maw possessed a U.S. law degree, 
the United States Court of  Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in LeClerc v. Webb upheld a Louisiana Supreme 
Court rule prohibiting these foreign born individuals 
from taking the Louisiana Bar due to their lack of  
legal permanent resident (LPR) status.4 LPR status is 
given to immigrants with the right to reside in the U.S. 
permanently. In denying non-LPRs from taking the 
bar examination, the State of  Louisiana denied them 
an opportunity to practice law in the state, denied 
Louisiana employers an opportunity to hire them 
(as well as other U.S. employers who need attorneys 
barred in Louisiana), and denied U.S. citizens in need 
of  legal services from utilizing and benefi tting from 
their legal skills and knowledge.
Had any of  these individuals been LPRs, 
they would have been allowed to take the Louisiana 
bar exam. The rule regarding LPRs and licensure 
exams fi nds its origins in In Re Griffi ths, where in 
1973 the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut 
law that prohibited non-U.S. citizens from taking 
the Connecticut bar exam.5 Since then, states have 
not been able to discriminate against LPRs seeking 
licensure in their respective professions.
If  states cannot deny LPRs an opportunity 
to take the tests required for licensure, why were the 
plaintiffs in LeClerc denied the same opportunity? 
Despite the ruling in Griffi ths, some states, such 
as Louisiana, have continued to limit licensing 
procedures and also deny licensure to certain classes 
of  immigrants. These states draw a distinction 
between LPRs and those foreign nationals “admitted 
temporarily and for a specifi c purpose,” referred to as 
nonimmigrants.6 But courts have differed on whether 
to permit such a distinction. While the LeClerc court 
upheld the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, 
barring nonimmigrants from taking licensing exams, 
the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of  New York invalidated a similarly 
restrictive law in Adusumelli v. Steiner.7 In Adusumelli, 
a New York education law limited U.S. citizens and 
LPRs to be licensed as pharmacists, leading a group 
of  26 nonimmigrant plaintiffs to fi le suit.8 The court 
overturned the law and allowed the nonimmigrant 
plaintiffs to take the licensing exams.9
The Adusumellli court provides a model that 
other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, should 
follow. Courts should not use the distinction between 
LPRs and nonimmigrants to deny foreign nationals 
the opportunity to enter licensed professions in the 
U.S. Nonimmigrants with the necessary skills and 
knowledge to successfully enter professions such as 
law, medicine, and engineering should be encouraged 
to enter the U.S. market without unnecessary and 
irrational barriers.
This article argues that federal immigration 
law preempts state laws that prohibit nonimmigrants 
from taking state licensing exams. These state 
laws occupy the fi eld of  immigrant employment 
authorization, which is the domain of  the federal 
government. In doing so, they stand as an obstacle to 
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the federal government’s decision regarding a foreign 
national’s admission into the U.S., placing conditions 
upon U.S. residency that are absent from federal law. 
Furthermore, under an equal protection analysis, 
there is no significant distinction between immigrants 
and nonimmigrants, and therefore, all classifications 
based on alienage should be subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny.
Part I of  this article describes the distinction 
between immigrants and nonimmigrants, explaining 
the reasoning and distinctions that states have used to 
justify the denial of  licensure to nonimmigrants. Parts 
II and III discuss the legal issues regarding professional 
licensing for immigrants and nonimmigrants, 
respectively. Parts II and II also include a discussion 
of  the Griffiths, LeClerc and Adusumelli decisions 
and their impact on federal immigration law. Part 
IV outlines the policy implications of  a distinction 
between immigrants and nonimmigrants in state 
licensing procedures. Specifically, Part IV discusses 
the harm done to nonimmigrants, U.S. employers, 
and the U.S. as a whole, when laws, regulations, and 
court decisions deny nonimmigrants the opportunity 
to enter licensed professions. Part V is a legal 
analysis of  the distinction between immigrants and 
nonimmigrants. This section applies legal tests to 
examine how federal law preempts restrictive state 
licensure laws, and argues for similar preemption 
during an equal protection analysis. Part VI concludes 
the article, and argues for the elimination of  state 
licensure laws that prohibit nonimmigrants from 
obtaining licensure.
I.		 DISTINCTION	BETWEEN	IMMIGRANTS	
AND	NONIMMIGRANTS
The Department of  Homeland Security 
(DHS) groups foreign nationals seeking to enter the 
U.S. into two broad categories: nonimmigrants and 
immigrants. Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals 
that are “admitted temporarily and for a specific 
purpose.”10 Several categories of  foreign nationals 
fall into the broader category of  nonimmigrants, 
including temporary workers, students, foreign 
diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.11 The 
complete list of  nonimmigrant visa classifications is 
set forth in the subsections of  Section 101(a)(15) of  
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).12
Nonimmigrants are restricted both on the 
amount of  time they can be present in the United 
States, and the activities in which they can participate.13 
For instance, a nonimmigrant admitted on a student 
visa does not have unfettered work authorization, as 
the individual is limited to the practical training that 
relates to the nonimmigrant’s student visa. Moreover, 
a nonimmigrant admitted as a temporary worker does 
not have authorization to attend a university.
Generally, nonimmigrants must express their 
intent to stay in the U.S. only for a short period of  
time. However, the U.S. Department of  State (State 
Department) has recognized a doctrine of  “dual 
intent” for certain classes of  nonimmigrants.14 After 
the Immigration Act of  1990, the State Department 
concluded that Congress should eliminate 
nonimmigrant intent as a factor in adjudicating 
applications for H-1 visas, which are used by 
temporary workers in specialty occupations, and L 
visas, which are used by intra-company transferees.15 
Thus, an applicant in either visa category can come to 
the U.S. in nonimmigrant status, while simultaneously 
pursuing permanent residence status.
The INA defines “immigrants” as “every alien 
except an alien who is within one of  the . . . classes 
of  nonimmigrant aliens” listed in Section 101(a)(15).16 
Under Section 214(b) of  the INA, immigration officials 
must presume that all foreign nationals entering the 
U.S. intend to immigrate to the U.S. permanently. But 
this intention is not presumed for those entering the 
U.S. in the L, V, and H-1 visa categories.17 Thus, all 
foreign nationals entering the U.S. as legal permanent 
residents (LPRs) are immigrants.
II.		LICENSING	AND	IMMIGRANTS	(LEGAL	
PERMANENT	RESIDENTS)
In the 1886 landmark case of  Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court allowed Chinese 
immigrants to bring an equal protection challenge 
against a San Francisco laundry ordinance, which was 
being discriminately enforced against them.18 The 
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
states from denying equal protection under U.S. law 
to persons within the several states.19 In Yick Wo, the 
Court established that lawfully present resident aliens 
were considered “persons” within the meaning of  the 
equal protection clause of  the 14th Amendment.20
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In Graham v. Richardson, in determining 
whether the states of  Arizona and Pennsylvania could 
deny government assistance to resident aliens, the 
Court went a step further than the Yick Wo Court. It 
declared, “classifications based on alienage, like those 
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect 
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”21 In Graham, the 
states posited that they had a “special public interest” 
in distribution of  government resources toward its 
own citizens.22 The Court rejected this argument, 
noting that resident aliens also pay taxes, and that “[t]
here can be no ‘special public interest’ in tax revenues 
to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis 
with the residents of  the State.”23
In 1973, the Court in In re Griffiths 
specifically addressed the question of  state licensing 
laws for LPRs. In Griffiths, an LPR with citizenship 
in the Netherlands satisfied all the qualifications for 
admission to the Connecticut bar, except for the 
requirement that an applicant had to be a U.S. citizen 
to be admitted to the bar.24 The Court again applied 
strict judicial scrutiny, and emphasized that because 
resident aliens pay taxes, may serve in the Armed 
Forces, and contribute to society in a variety of  ways, 
they should not be denied the opportunity to become 
licensed professionals.25 Thus, the Court placed a 
heavy burden on states in justifying the denial of  
employment opportunities based on alienage.26
The Griffiths Court noted that states have a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that those admitted 
to the bar meet “the character and general fitness 
requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.”27 
However, the Court found that the character and 
general fitness requirements were not used by the 
state of  Connecticut to exclude bar membership 
for foreign nationals.28 Instead, the state justified the 
exclusion by noting that foreign nationals may have a 
divided allegiance to the U.S. that would impede their 
ability to carry out certain duties, such as signing writs 
and subpoenas, and administering oaths.29
The Court found the state’s “divided 
allegiance” argument unconvincing. The decision 
noted that these duties “hardly involve matters of  
state policy or acts of  such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens.”30 Furthermore, the 
Court opined that although some resident aliens may 
be unsuited for the bar, it does not justify a wholesale 
exclusion of  resident aliens.31 In the Court’s opinion, 
the continued scrutiny attorneys face once admitted 
to the bar, such as sanctions and disbarment, would 
reduce unethical behavior in resident alien attorneys.32
The Court has applied the same reasoning 
from Griffiths in other cases, prohibiting states from 
limiting access to professions based on alienage. In 
Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court struck down a New 
York state law that limited the appointment of  
competitive civil service jobs to U.S. citizens, and 
excluded aliens.33 Likewise, in Examining Board of  
Engineers v. Flores de Otero, the Court struck down a 
Puerto Rican law that limited the granting of  civil 
engineering private practice licenses to U.S. citizens.34
The Court has delineated two exceptions to 
the general rule that states cannot deny employment 
opportunities based on alienage. First, the Court has 
recognized that states can have a legitimate interest 
in limiting the access to employment that serves a 
political and governmental function to U.S. Citizens.35 
For instance, in Foley v. Connelie, the Court upheld a 
New York state law that permitted only U.S citizens 
to be employed by the state police force.36 Second, a 
state may deny employment opportunities to those 
who are not lawfully present in the U.S.37 For example, 
in DeCanas v. Bica, the Court upheld a California 
law imposing criminal sanctions on employers 
who knowingly employ immigrants without work 
authorization, which result in fewer employers willing 
to hire undocumented workers.38
III.	LICENSING	AND	NONIMMIGRANTS
While the Supreme Court has struck 
down laws that prohibit non-citizens from entering 
licensed professions, it has never directly addressed 
the issue of  whether states may distinguish between 
immigrants and nonimmigrants in their licensure 
procedures. However, lower courts have addressed 
the issue and have reached varied conclusions.
In LeClerc, the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit considered a Louisiana Supreme Court 
rule that restricted the admission of  U.S. citizens and 
resident aliens to the Louisiana bar.39 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court in In Re Bourke, interpreted the phrase 
“resident alien” to include “only . . . those aliens who 
have attained permanent resident status in the United 
States.”40 Challenging this decision, the plaintiffs in 
LeClerc claimed that the Court in Griffiths, in applying 
strict judicial scrutiny to a law affecting LPRs, 
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supported the proposition that all immigrants were a 
suspect class (a class for which all laws discriminating 
against the class are inherently suspect) and, therefore, 
the Louisiana rule is subject to strict scrutiny.41 This 
line of  reason follows from the Graham court’s 
reasoning that it is inherently suspect for a law to uses 
classifications based on alienage and, therefore, such 
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny.42
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs, 
stating that nonimmigrants “are not a suspect class 
under Griffiths.”43 The court noted a “paramount” 
distinction between the plaintiffs in LeClerc and the 
plaintiffs in Griffiths, as the former was a group of  
nonimmigrants and the latter was a group of  LPRs.44 
The court noted that nonimmigrants “ordinarily 
stipulate before entry to this country that they have 
no intention of  abandoning their native citizenship.”45 
In the eyes of  the court, nonimmigrants are not 
“similarly situated” to U.S. citizens in the way that 
permanent residents are because of  their temporary 
connection to the U.S. Because of  this temporary 
and dissimilar connection, nonimmigrants are not 
entitled to strict judicial scrutiny.46 The court upheld 
the Louisiana rule applying rational basis review.47
The Adusumelli court reached a different 
conclusion.48 In Adusumelli v. Steiner, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of  New York 
considered a New York education law that limited the 
ability of  U.S. citizens and permanent residents to be 
licensed as pharmacists.49 The twenty-six plaintiffs in 
Adusumelli were nonimmigrant pharmacists residing 
in the U.S., either with H-1B visas or “TN” temporary 
worker status (a status created by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for citizens of  
Canada and Mexico).50
The Adusumelli court found that the state 
law interfered with federal immigration power 
reserved for Congress in the U.S. Constitution 
through the Naturalization Clause, which gives 
Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of  
Naturalization”, and the Supremacy Clause, which 
states that the Constitution and other federal laws 
will be the supreme law of  the land.51 The state 
argued that Congress explicitly gave states discretion 
in this field through  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(v)(A), 
which states that “[i]f  an occupation requires a state 
or local license for an individual to fully perform 
the duties of  the occupation, an alien . . . seeking [a 
temporary work visa] in that occupation must have 
that license prior to approval of  the petition.”52 The 
court, however, concluded that this merely outlines a 
division of  labor, finding that the federal government 
determines admissibility, while the state determines 
professional competence.53
The State of  New York, referencing LeClerc, 
noted that legal permanent residents pay taxes, 
can serve in the military, and can work in the U.S. 
indefinitely, whereas other foreign nationals have 
less in common with U.S. citizens.54 The state argued 
that the plaintiffs, therefore, were not entitled to 
strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.55 The 
court noted, however, that nonimmigrants are largely 
subject to the same tax rules as U.S. citizens, at least 
in regards to their U.S. income.56
Additionally, the Adusumelli court referenced 
the doctrine of  dual intent.57 This doctrine allows 
holders of  certain classes of  visas to pursue 
permanent residence while residing in the U.S. as a 
nonimmigrant. Regarding this doctrine, the court 
noted that nonimmigrants are not as transient as 
other courts have characterized them to be, and that 
many nonimmigrants are in the process of  applying 
for green cards.58 The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Nyquist v. Mauclet, played a pivotal role in the 
Adusumelli court’s reasoning regarding the somewhat 
transient nature of  nonimmigrants.59 In Nyquist, the 
Supreme Court considered a New York law that 
denied financial assistance for higher education to 
those who had not applied for citizenship, or did not 
intend to do so once eligible.60 The Supreme Court 
applied strict scrutiny in invalidating the law, and 
rejected the practice of  discriminating against foreign 
nationals on the basis of  transience.61
Furthermore, the Adusumelli decision noted 
that nonimmigrants are no less likely to be the victim of  
irrational discrimination than their LPR counterparts; 
in fact, they are more likely to be discriminated 
against.62 The court noted that when a group is subject 
to such irrational discrimination, courts usually apply 
at least heightened, or intermediate, scrutiny.63 The 
court found that denial of  an opportunity to obtain 
a pharmacist’s license triggers at least intermediate 
scrutiny, and that is was unnecessary to determine 
whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny 
because the law would fail at either level.64 The court 
found that the state was unable to show that there 
were “important governmental objectives and that the 
discriminatory means employed [were] substantially 
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related to the achievement of  those objectives,” as 
required in intermediate scrutiny cases.65
IV.		POLICY	IMPLICATIONS	OF	THE	
IMMIGRANT/NONIMMIGRANT	
LICENSING	DISTINCTION
Restrictive state licensure laws deny 
opportunities to highly educated and qualified foreign 
workers, who not only benefit the U.S. workforce, 
but also the nation as a whole. Congress did not 
create multiple categories of  nonimmigrant work 
visas haphazardly. For instance, with the H-1B visa, 
Congress intentionally promoted the inclusion of  
highly educated and qualified foreign nationals into 
the U.S. workforce. The H-1B classification is a visa 
category that allows foreign nationals who work in 
“specialty occupations” to seek employment in the 
U.S.66 The law defines a “specialty occupation” as one 
that requires a “theoretical and practical application 
of  a body of  highly specialized knowledge,” and a 
bachelor’s degree or its equivalent.67 While full-state 
licensure is required to practice in a specific state, 
the law does not permit states to create separate 
requirements or deny licenses based on alienage.68
In determining whether foreign nationals 
should be able to work in the U.S., either on a 
temporary or permanent basis, Congress evaluated 
the costs and benefits of  immigration. Regarding 
licensed professions, foreign nationals must meet the 
same requirements of  licensure as other U.S. citizens; 
however, there is no indication that Congress intended 
for foreign nationals to meet additional requirements.
Furthermore, when state licensing 
requirements for foreign nationals are not uniform, 
the inconsistency creates uncertainty for foreign 
nationals who wish to enter a licensed profession. 
Numerous professions require licensure to practice 
in multiple states, but because of  the varied nature 
of  state licensure recruitments, a foreign national 
admitted to practice in one state may be ineligible 
in another. Likewise, a foreign national who wishes 
to transfer jobs once in the U.S., could face barriers 
that U.S. citizens and permanent residents do not 
encounter. For instance, an attorney with an H-1B 
visa practicing law in New York would not be able to 
transfer to a job in Louisiana, regardless if  the attorney 
had the knowledge and skill necessary to pass the 
Louisiana bar. Essentially, these requirements reduce 
the freedom of  nonimmigrants, and discourage 
foreign nationals from accepting new employment or 
changing jobs.
Proponents of  restrictive licensure laws 
contend that licensed professionals who are non-U.S. 
citizens, or are LPRs, are more likely to be transient, 
and are likely to leave their job after a relatively short 
period of  time and return to their native country. 
To mitigate these concerns regarding transience, 
U.S. immigration policy should encourage licensed 
professionals to remain in the U.S. With dual intent 
visas, such as H-1B and L-1 visas, even nonimmigrants 
have a way to become citizens, which reduces the risk 
of  transience. While some professionals may come 
to the U.S. without the intent to remain permanently, 
immigration policy should balance the risk of  
transience against the benefits these foreign nationals 
could provide during their temporary employment. 
These benefits, although temporary, greatly outweigh 
the negative effects of  transience.
Domestic employers benefit tremendously 
from their ability to hire the best professionals from 
around the world. Likewise, the nation as a whole 
benefits from being able to obtain high quality 
professional services, and arbitrary obstacles based 
on the nationality and immigration status only 
hinders this ability. Thus, states should not only 
permit foreign nationals to apply for such licensure, 
they should encourage it.
V.		 LEGAL	ANALYSIS	OF	THE	IMMIGRANT/
NONIMMIGRANT	DISTINCTION
A.  Federal immigration law supersedes state laws 
that prohibit nonimmigrants from entering licensed 
professions
As the Adusumelli court noted, the federal 
government has sole power to implement U.S. 
immigration policy. As previously stated, this power 
comes from the U.S. Constitution through the 
Naturalization Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.69 
Various courts have used the DeCanas tests, which 
is described below, to determine whether federal 
law preempts a state law that affects immigration. 
Although the Adusumelli court referred to the DeCanas 
case and tests, and reached a conclusion in harmony 
with the tests, it did so without explicitly applying 
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them. This section will analyze and apply the DeCanas 
tests to the immigrant/nonimmigrant distinction.
DeCanas	Tests
In League of  United Latin American Citizens 
v. Wilson (LULAC), the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of  California reviewed a voter-
approved initiative. The initiative gave state officials 
the authority to verify the immigration status of  
people with whom they come in contact, and deny 
health care, education, and other benefits based 
on their determination.70 In determining whether 
the initiative at issue in LULAC was preempted by 
federal law, the District Court looked to the Supreme 
Court case of  DeCanas v. Bica.71 In DeCanas, migrant 
farm workers in California challenged a state law 
that placed criminal sanctions upon employers who 
knowingly employed undocumented immigrants, if  
such employment adversely affected lawful resident 
workers.72
The Court in DeCanas proffered three tests 
to assist in their analysis of  the state law. The first 
DeCanas test requires a court to determine whether 
the state action is a “regulation of  immigration.”73 The 
DeCanas Court defines “regulation of  immigration” 
as “essentially a determination of  who should or 
should not be admitted into the country, and the 
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”74 
However, not all state regulations that affect 
immigrants are “regulations of  immigration.”75 For 
example, in DeCanas, the Court dealt with a California 
law that imposed criminal sanctions on employers 
who knowingly hired immigrants without legal work 
authorization. This was found to be a regulation 
of  employment, not a pre-empted “regulation of  
immigration.”76
The second DeCanas test, requires a court to 
determine whether “Congress intended to ‘occupy the 
field’ which the statute attempts to regulate.”77 Even 
if  the state law is not a “regulation of  immigration,” 
it may nevertheless be preempted if  it occupies a field 
Congress has claimed for itself.78 The DeCanas Court 
concluded that, for a state law to be preempted, the 
“clear and manifest purpose” of  Congress must 
be “complete ouster of  state power including state 
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal 
laws.”79
The third DeCanas test requires the court to 
determine if  a state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of  the full purposes 
and objectives of  Congress.”80 This test was fashioned 
by the Supreme Court in Hines v. Davidowitz.81 In Hines, 
the Court examined a Pennsylvania law that set up a 
state level immigrant registration scheme, which had 
registration, information disclosure, and identification 
requirements for aliens beyond what was required 
by federal law.82 The Court decided that federal law 
preempted the Pennsylvania law because the federal 
government had exercised its constitutional authority 
to implement the standards for alien registration and 
states could not add to these requirements.83
1.  State licensure laws survive the first 
DeCanas test, because they are not 
regulations of  immigration.
As noted above, a “regulation of  
immigration” is “essentially a determination of  who 
should or should not be admitted into the country, 
and the conditions under which a legal entrant 
may remain.”84 However, if  the state law primarily 
affects another field other than immigration, it is 
not considered a regulation of  immigration.85 This 
was the case in DeCanas, where the state sanctioned 
employers rather than determining the admission 
status of  the immigrant, or altering the conditions 
under which an immigrant may remain in the 
U.S.86 The Court described the California law as 
having a “purely speculative and indirect impact on 
immigration.”87 In contrast, the LULAC court stated 
that to require a state official to question arrestees, 
applicants for state welfare benefits, students, and 
parents of  students regarding their immigration 
status, was a regulation of  immigration.88 The court 
found that the primary purpose of  the initiative was 
to place limitations on foreign nationals, and that 
federal law explicitly allows these individuals to enter 
and remain in the U.S. Accordingly, the court held 
that federal law preempted the state initiative.
State licensure laws that limit licensure to U.S. 
citizens and LPRs more closely resemble the state law 
at issue in DeCanas, rather than the initiative at issue 
in LULAC. Like DeCanas, state licensure laws do not 
specifically place conditions on who may remain in 
the U.S., rather these laws place regulations only on 
employment. The aim of  state licensing bodies is to 
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ensure that those who receive professional licenses 
meet the profession’s minimum qualifications and 
standards. Because this is a permissible state function, 
the fact that immigration status is a factor that a 
licensing body may find relevant, nevertheless does 
not make it a regulation of  immigration.
One might argue that like the initiative 
in LULAC, prohibitive state licensing laws place 
conditions on those who may remain in the U.S. and, 
thus, fail the first DeCanas test. However, the aim of  
the state licensing bodies is not to determine who 
may or may not enter or remain in the country. The 
licensing bodies’ only concern is with the standards 
for admission into the various professions. Thus, 
while an argument comparing state licensing laws 
to LULAC is interesting, it is likely not compelling 
enough to invalidate these state licensure laws.
2.  Prohibitive state licensure laws fail 
the second DeCanas test, as Congress 
intended to occupy the field of  
immigrant admissions.
The second DeCanas test notes that federal 
law preempts state or local law, regardless of  whether 
it is a “regulation of  immigration,” if  Congress 
intended to “occupy the field” that the state law seeks 
to regulate.89 Under this test, federal law preempts 
state law only if  Congress’s clear and manifest 
purpose is a complete ouster of  state regulatory 
power within the field.90
In DeCanas, the Court noted that states have 
“broad authority under their police powers to regulate 
the employment relationship to protect workers 
within the State.”91 Therefore, the state in DeCanas had 
the power to ensure that California employers would 
not employ those individuals not lawfully authorized 
to work in the U.S.92 The Court found no compelling 
evidence that Congress, through the INA, intended 
to oust state powers to regulate employment to 
ensure a lawful workforce.93 Therefore, the California 
law survived the second DeCanas test.94
State licensure laws are distinguishable from 
DeCanas in this regard. State licensing bodies have the 
authority to determine the standards for admission 
to a profession. This is a different type of  authority 
than the police power at issue in DeCanas. The state in 
DeCanas merely determined whether employees met 
federal standards for lawful employment, whereas 
state licensure boards create standards for admission 
at the state level to various professions.
It is evident that the federal government 
sought to occupy the field of  immigrant admissions. 
The federal government determines what the 
standards and requirements are for admission to the 
U.S. through a nonimmigrant visa, and adjudicates 
individuals on a case-by-case basis. For instance, 
with H-1B visas, Congress has determined the 
qualifications necessary to work in the U.S. in a 
specialty occupation.95 While state licensure is 
required prior to issuance of  a visa, the Adusumelli 
court correctly noted a division of  labor.96 The federal 
government retains its domain over determinations 
of  admissibility, and the state government determines 
professional competence.97
3.  Prohibitive state licensure rules violate 
the third DeCanas test as they stand 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of  the full purposes and 
objectives of  Congress.
Under the third DeCanas test, federal 
immigration law preempts state and local regulations 
when they are found to be obstacles to “the 
accomplishment and execution of  the full purposes 
and objectives of  Congress.”98 The LULAC court 
stated this test somewhat differently, noting there is 
preemption if  state laws conflict with federal law, and 
compliance with both is impossible.99 The Court in 
Hines v. Davidowitz utilized this compliance test.
In Hines, the Court struck down annual 
registration and state identification requirements, 
because the federal government has its own uniform 
registration and identification requirements.100 
Similarly, the classification, notification, and 
cooperation/reporting provisions of  the initiative 
at issue in LULAC, violated the third DeCanas test, 
because they conflicted with federal deportation 
laws.101 Furthermore, federal law preempted 
provisions of  the LULAC initiative that denied state 
benefits to immigrants when state officials reasonably 
suspected that an immigrant was not lawfully present. 
The Court held that the initiative was preempted 
because a state official’s “reasonable suspicion” is not 
the same as verification under federal law.102
Similarly, prohibitive state licensure laws 
directly conflict with federal immigration policy, 
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and are in violation of  the third DeCanas test. The 
federal government determines whether foreign 
nationals meet the requirements to work in the U.S. 
through nonimmigrant work visas. This includes 
a determination of  whether these individuals 
are qualified to practice in the specific specialty 
occupation. And generally, one of  the requirements 
for foreign nationals to obtain employment is to 
first become licensed by the state in their particular 
field. Thus, a foreign national must be able to 
take bar exams, medical licensing exams, etc. to 
determine admissibility. When a state determines 
that nonimmigrants are ineligible to take such an 
exam, the state stands as an obstacle to the federal 
government’s determination of  admissibility.
B.  There is no significant distinction between 
immigrants and nonimmigrants for purposes of  
equal protection analysis and strict scrutiny should 
also apply to laws affecting nonimmigrants.
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Yick 
Wo determined that legally present resident aliens are 
“persons” for the purpose of  an equal protection 
analysis.103 Furthermore, classifications based on 
alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and the 
Court will apply this strict scrutiny to laws affecting 
LPRs.104
Despite the Supreme Court’s application of  
strict scrutiny to alienage classifications, during an 
equal protection analysis the LeClerc court drew a 
distinction between immigrants and nonimmigrants.105 
The Adusumelli court disagreed with the LeClerc court, 
noting that nonimmigrants are generally subject to the 
same federal income tax rules as their LPR and U.S. 
citizen counterparts.106 Furthermore, the doctrine 
of  dual intent allows certain nonimmigrants to seek 
permanent residence in the U.S., while residing in the 
U.S. on temporary visas.107
The Adusumelli court’s analysis is correct 
and the most viable. However, the court did not 
reach a holding as to whether strict scrutiny or 
intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws affecting 
nonimmigrants. The court found the determination 
of  the level of  judicial scrutiny pointless, because 
the licensing law under either standard would fail.108 
Despite the Court’s decision to forgo such a holding, 
its analysis strongly suggests that laws affecting 
nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny.
The Adusumelli court noted that the Supreme 
Court in Nyquist applied strict scrutiny to a law affecting 
foreign nationals who had not, and did not intend to 
apply for permanent residency.109 Therefore, it logically 
follows from Nyquist that strict scrutiny should apply 
to licensing laws preventing nonimmigrants from 
entering licensed professions. Furthermore, the Graham 
Court’s reason for determining that classifications 
based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny was that 
such a classification was inherently suspect, and that 
immigrants are a “discrete and insular minority.”110 
Classifications that affect nonimmigrants are no less 
inherently suspect than classifications that affect LPRs, 
and nonimmigrants are certainly a discrete and insular 
minority.
Should the Supreme Court consider a case 
regarding licensing of  nonimmigrants, the Court 
should clarify that its application of  strict scrutiny 
to classifications based on alienage covers all foreign 
nationals, regardless of  whether they are immigrants 
or nonimmigrants.
VI.		CONCLUSION
The state licensing process for professionals 
should be open to U.S. citizens, immigrants, and 
nonimmigrants alike. Federal immigration power 
preempts states laws that prohibit nonimmigrants 
from entering professions such as law, medicine 
and engineering. Moreover, Congress has occupied 
the field of  immigrant admissions, and, thus, these 
state licensing laws stand as an obstacle to federal 
determination of  admissibility. Furthermore, such 
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny because there 
is no significant distinction between immigrants and 
nonimmigrants in an equal protection analysis.
Nonimmigrants who face the barriers such as 
ones faced by the plaintiffs in LeClerc, who are merely 
coming to the U.S. to better their lives by entering 
licensed professions, have a tough and precarious 
predicament, and deserve relief. The denial of  an 
opportunity to enter their professions not only hurts 
the individuals, but U.S. employers, and citizens 
who would benefit from their work. Congress and 
state legislatures should eliminate prohibitive state 
licensure laws and regulations, such as the Louisiana 
bar rule. And if  necessary, the courts should act and 
strike them down. If  nonimmigrants can take the 
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licensing exams required for their field in all states, an 
impediment will disappear, uncertainty will dissipate, 
and highly educated and qualified workers will be 
encouraged to bring their skills to the U.S.
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